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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: To analyze the regional governance of the health systemin 
relation to management strategies and disputes.
METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES: A qualitative study with health 
managers from 19 municipalities in the health region of Bahia, Northeastern 
Brazil. Data were drawn from 17 semi-structured interviews of state, 
regional, and municipal health policymakers and managers; a focus group; 
observations of the regional interagency committee; and documents in 2012. 
The political-institutional and the organizational components were analyzed 
in the light of dialectical hermeneutics.
RESULTS: The regional interagency committee is the chief regional 
governance strategy/component and functions as a strategic tool for 
strengthening governance. It brings together a diversity of members 
responsible for decision making in the healthcare territories, who need 
to negotiate the allocation of funding and the distribution of facilities for 
common use in the region. The high turnover of health secretaries, their 
lack of autonomy from the local executive decisions, inadequate technical 
training to exercise their function, and the influence of party politics on 
decision making stand as obstacles to the regional interagency committee’s 
permeability to social demands. Funding is insufficient to enable the 
fulfillment of the officially integrated agreed-upon program or to boost public 
supply by the system, requiring that public managers procure services from 
the private market at values higher than the national health service price 
schedule (Brazilian Unified Health System Table). The study determined 
that “facilitators” under contract to health departments accelerated access 
to specialized (diagnostic, therapeutic and/or surgical) services in other 
municipalities by direct payment to physicians for procedure costs already 
covered by the Brazilian Unified Health System.
CONCLUSIONS: The characteristics identified a regionalized system with 
a conflictive pattern of governance and intermediate institutionalism. The 
regional interagency committee’s managerial routine needs to incorporate 
more democratic devices for connecting with educational institutions, devices 
that are more permeable to social demands relating to regional policy making.
DESCRIPTORS: Health Services Administration. Regional Health 
Planning. Health Care Rationing. Health Services Coverage. 
Consumer Participation. Health Management. Health Manager. 
Unified Health System.
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There are wide disparities among Brazilian munici-
palities because of geographic, demographic, political, 
technical-administrative, socioeconomic, and financial 
conditions, as well as the complexity of the population’s 
needs and demands. These disparities present prob-
lems that can only be challenged by moving beyond 
municipal borders, as “the scope of comprehensive-
ness depends upon the articulation of municipal care 
systems in regional networks”8 (p. 287). In fact, these 
disparities expose the need for inter-municipal connec-
tions that open up space for “the profusion of new forms 
of relationship between State and society, placing the 
RESUMO
OBJETIVO: Analisar o sistema de governança regional em saúde quanto a 
estratégias e disputas de gestão.
PROCEDIMENTOS METODOLÓGICOS: Pesquisa qualitativa com gestores 
de saúde de 19 municípios que integram a região de saúde no estado da Bahia. 
Foram realizadas 17 entrevistas semiestruturadas com gestores/gerentes 
(estadual, regional e municipal), grupo focal, observações na Comissão 
Intergestores Regional e documentos institucionais, em 2012. Foram analisados 
os componentes político-institucional e organizacional e interpretados pela 
hermenêutica-dialética.
RESULTADOS: A comissão intergestores regional foi a principal estratégia 
da governança regional, sendo ferramenta fundamental para fortalecimento 
da governança por reunir diferentes sujeitos responsáveis pela tomada de 
decisão nos territórios sanitários e pela negociação da alocação de recursos e 
distribuição dos estabelecimentos de uso comum na região. A rotatividade de 
secretários de saúde, baixa autonomia nas decisões executivas, a qualificação 
técnica insuficiente para exercício da função e o atravessamento das políticas 
partidárias na tomada de decisão são fatores que obstruem a comissão 
intergestores regional às demandas sociais. Recursos financeiros insuficientes 
não viabilizam o cumprimento da programação pactuada integrada nem o 
aumento da oferta pública na rede e impunham ao gestor a compra de serviços 
no mercado privado por valores acima da Tabela do Sistema Único de Saúde. 
Foram relatados atravessadores contratados para agilizar o acesso aos serviços 
especializados (diagnóstico, terapêutico e/ou cirúrgico) em outros municípios 
mediante pagamento direto a médicos por procedimentos já custeados pelo 
Sistema Único de Saúde.
CONCLUSÕES: A rede regionalizada de saúde apresenta padrão de governança 
conflitante e com institucionalidade intermediária. A comissão intergestores 
regional necessita incorporar, à rotina de gestão, dispositivos mais democráticos 
que logrem articulação com instituições de ensino, permeáveis às demandas 
sociais, para definição das políticas regionais.
DESCRITORES: Administração de Serviços de Saúde. Regionalização. 
Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde. Cobertura de Serviços de 
Saúde. Participação Comunitária. Gestão em Saúde. Gestor de Saúde. 
Sistema Único de Saúde.
INTRODUCTION
bedrocks of the power structure, the organization and 
management of existing political institutions, within the 
framework of public discussion”5 (p. 11), conferring a 
new governance model that combines decentralization 
with the need for solidary integration.
In Brazil, delays in regionalizing the Sistema Único de 
Saúde (SUS – Unified Health System) pacified the local 
health systems’ capacity for problem solving, ampli-
fying municipalities’ disputes over resources instead 
of creating an interdependent and cooperative network. 
Thus, the absence of regional planning in strategies to 
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decentralize the SUS intensified the inequalities of these 
sub-national units. It also weakened and damaged the role 
of state power; since 1990, thousands of local, isolated 
systems have sprung up without the managerial capacity 
to facilitate comprehensiveness and with no mechanisms 
or expertise to form inter-municipal networks.24
Regionalization is an attribute of national health 
systems that are organized to increase access and reduce 
inequalities, strengthen the principles of universality 
and equality.13 In this sense, regionalization should 
facilitate the use of technology for care in an oppor-
tune time and place, anywhere in the territory. It should 
also be guided by a systemic rationality, which coop-
eratively contemplates disparities present in the distri-
bution of different services and resources necessary for 
comprehensiveness and inter-sectoral coordination.20
Studies have shown the difficulties in combining a 
“regional government,” given inadequacies in funding, 
fragile work management policies, constraints on the 
provision of services, and extended waiting times.a The 
private sector’s interference in the SUS throughout the 
entire process of regionalization,b and the conflictive 
and disputatious relationships among municipalities, 
in the absence of any regional discussion”,11 empha-
size the strategic role that state management plays in 
inducing regionalizationc and establishing regional 
bodies.a Therefore, in contrast to an objective image 
that models gains from regionalization, its implemen-
tation has been complex and incremental, alternating 
between advances and retreats.
Rule 7,508,d of June 28, 2011, directs the establish-
ment of regionalized networks and defines health 
regions as privileged spaces for the integration of health 
services. It considers the Regional Master Plan as its 
starting point, but makes the necessary adaptations that 
respond appropriately to territorial dynamics, encour-
aging cooperative interagency action. It also defines the 
role of regional interagency committees as bodies that 
connect municipal administrators. These administrators 
should propose the distribution of health services and 
workers in a coordinated and solidary manner to ensure 
broad access to health actions at different care levels, 
enabling equality and comprehensiveness through 
care management. In this sense, regional interagency 
committees are innovative, as they are co-management 
bodies in a regional space. They establish a permanent 
and continuous channel for negotiation and decision 
making between the municipalities and the state, filling 
a “void” in regional governance.24
Regional governance is one of the components of a 
regionalized network16 and is recognized as a process 
of participation and negotiation among several subjects 
with different degrees of autonomy. It represents a 
diverse group of interests (public and private) in a 
stable institutional framework that encourages coop-
erative relationships among governments, agents, orga-
nizations, and citizens to establish links and networks 
between subjects and institutions.25
The importance of a regional interagency committee 
and its strategic role in the regionalization process 
makes it possible to identify specific types of gover-
nance.25 Governance depends on institutional design 
and dialogue with a society’s organized groups to 
define, monitor, and implement public policies.3
Thus, governance must involve the modes of exercising 
authority and the processes of integrating social inter-
ests in the government’s agenda.6 It can be used as an 
analytical tool to research and transform the processes 
of policy formulation and health system management. 
The analytic use of governance allows it to “describe 
and explain the interactions of actors, processes, and 
rules of the game, and thus gain a better understanding 
of behavior and decision making in society”10 (p. 36).
From the perspective of an integrated system, the 
management of a regionalized network is vital to the 
core of a social policy such as the SUS. Health problems 
demand a coordinated, interdependent, and cooperative 
system with “multiple dimensions of integration between 
different sub-systems relating the clinic and governance 
to collective representations and values”9 (p. 336).
The objective of this study is to analyze the regional 
governance system for health in terms of management 
strategies and disputes.
METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
This is a case study in the health region of Vitória 
da Conquista, BA, including 19 municipalities that 
comprise the Comissão Intergestores Regional (CIR – 
Regional Interagency Committee). The case study was 
adopted to explore the organizations’ dynamics, the 
inter-relationships between programs’ implementation 
a Lopes CMN. Regionalização em saúde: o caso de uma microrregião no Ceará (1998-2002 e 2007-2009) [tese de doutorado]. Salvador: 
Instituto de Saúde Coletiva da UFBA; 2010. 
b Coelho APS. O público e o privado na regionalização da saúde: processo decisório e condução da política no Estado do Espírito Santo 
[dissertação de mestrado]. Rio de Janeiro: Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública; 2011. 
c Pereira AMM. Dilemas federativos e regionalização da saúde: o papel do gestor estadual do SUS em Minas Gerais [dissertação de mestrado]. 
Rio de Janeiro: Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública; 2009.
d Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos. Decreto nº 7.508, de 28 de junho de 2011. Regulamenta a Lei 
nº 8.080, de 19 de setembro de 1990, para dispor sobre a organização do Sistema Único de Saúde - SUS, o planejamento da saúde, a 
assistência à saúde e a articulação interfederativa, e dá outras providências [cited 2014 Jul 8]. Available from: http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/decreto/D7508.htm
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and results, and how and why things happen.23 The 
results emerged from the analyses and intersections 
of narratives produced in 17 semi-structured inter-
views18 with administrators/managers at the state (three 
subjects), regional (three subjects), and municipal 
(11 subjects) levels, as well as a focus group with insti-
tutional supporters from the State Secretary of Health. 
Analyses of records from “nonparticipant” observation7 
and the CIR meetings conducted between 2011 and 2012 
were included. The respondents occupied a strategic 
position in the Health secretariats (Municipal and State) 
or in the regional board of health. They were chosen 
through an observation of their performance (active and 
frequent) in the CIR meetings and through recommen-
dations from key informants who selected the admin-
istrators/managers that had accumulated experience in 
their respective positions and/or had great representa-
tion/influence among their peers. All interviews and 
observations were conducted by one of the authors of 
this study. Part of an “analysis matrix for care manage-
ment in a regionalized health system” was usede at the 
political, institutional, and organizational levels, starting 
from their sub-dimensions and respective indicators to 
craft the scripts for interview and observation (Table 1).
The political-institutional level is responsible for the 
legal framework, and thus the subjects’ proposals/inten-
tions and actions to implement regionalized networks. 
The organizational level includes an operational dimen-
sion, which occurs at the interfaces between various 
institutions and organizations in the health regions, 
undergoing interventions and interactions by different 
subjects – which comprise and imprint a logic for 
management and production in the network.
To analyze the results, the data was collected2,18 from a 
general reading of the transcribed material, and a first 
organization of the different data was included in the 
interviews, focus group, and observations. Next, the 
material was classified as per Assis2 and Minayo;18 in 
this stage, the transcripts were thoroughly read, and 
the passages with relevant structures and central ideas 
(nuclei of meaning) were selected, grouped, and classi-
fied as per the sub-dimensions of the “analysis matrix” 
that defined the investigation’s boundaries. The argu-
ments from the interviews and focus group were chal-
lenged, followed by a comparison between the different 
discourses, in a dialectical confrontation of the subjects’ 
ideas and positions that established relationships for 
regional management. For the final data analysis,2,18 
the assorted data that had been collected was woven 
together, supplemented by the minutes from the CIR 
meetings, and convergences and divergences were 
identified, linking them with a theoretical framework 
of dialectical hermeneutics,17,18 to produce a compre-
hensive and critical analysis (Figure).
From a methodological viewpoint, the hermeneutic 
approach seeks to clarify the context of different 
subjects and the proposals that they produce, since 
it claims to have a level of rationality and responsi-
bility in different languages that serve as a commu-
nication vehicle. In fact, dialectical thinking creates 
instruments to critique and understand the contradic-
tions in language; it values the dynamic processes of 
contradictions, within which the opposition between 
evaluator and evaluated is itself established as the 
foundation of social practices.19 From this perspective, 
dialectical hermeneutics are productive for supporting 
qualitative assessments of understanding communi-
cation. While hermeneutics emphasizes the signifi-
cance of what is consensual in mediation, agreement, 
and unity of meaning, dialectics is oriented toward 
difference, contrast, dissent, disruption of meaning, 
and criticism.17,18
Four empirical categories emerged from the analyses, 
and they comprise the results and discussion: a) CIR’s 
organization: the subjects’ dynamic in the construc-
tion of local and regional policies, b) implications of 
the SUS’ financing and the health region’s subordina-
tion to the logic of private interests, c) immediacy in 
debates and regional planning, and d) micropowers: the 
paradox between regional bodies and local interests.
The research was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública 
Sérgio Arouca of the Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (ENSP/
FIOCRUZ) on October 4, 2011, Opinion 207/11.
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CIR’s organization: the subjects’ dynamic in the 
construction of local and regional policies
The CIR is not an equitable organization. It comprises 
two representatives from the Secretaria Estadual de 
Saúde (SES – State Secretary of Health) and all 19 
municipal Health secretaries within the health region. 
It was a deliberative institutional space, with a local 
and regional governance status capable of interfering 
in regional health policies through its agents. However, 
there was no social participation. In the CIR, there was 
local power reproduction (of a clientelistic tradition), 
which was connected, through financial inducement 
rather than collective needs, to other local interests of 
a partisan political order. It did not redefine new health 
scenarios, but rather created a healthcare network 
without a solidary identity, even though the municipali-
ties were interdependent. Some political and organiza-
tional characteristics of the health region’s municipali-
ties are in Table 2.
e Santos AM. Gestão do cuidado na microrregião de saúde de Vitória da Conquista (Bahia): desafios para constituição de rede regionalizada 
com cuidados coordenados pela Atenção Primária à Saúde [tese de doutorado]. Rio de Janeiro: Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública; 2013.
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Although there were regular CIR meetings in the 
Vitória da Conquista region, BA, Northeastern Brazil, 
analysis revealed that the subjects’ dynamics in formu-
lating and steering the agendas implied tentative strides 
toward strengthening the regional network of health 
services; roundtable discussions were reduced, causing 
the committee to be underutilized. The CIR remained 
a bureaucratic enclave, with agendas set by national/
state policy, leaving insufficient space for dialogue on 
the causes of specific problems in the region; these 
characteristics are similar to those observed in the 
health region of Baixada Santista, SP, Southeastern 
Brazil.11 The plenary sessions were marred by delays 
and absences of the incumbent members, inattention 
and, very often, the administrators’ lack of interest in 
discussing regional issues. In fact, they restricted their 
participation and collaboration to the agendas that were 
of interest to their own municipality, relegating region-
alization, contradictorily, to the background.
The Health secretaries’ professional training interfered 
with their understanding of relevant subjects discussed 
in the plenary sessions, leading many administrators to 
omit their opinion entirely. In fact, they ceded ground to 
those secretaries with some training in the area and/or 
with a long history in the position (even without specific 
training), who had accumulated knowledge from expe-
rience. In the CIR, the debates were shortened to fit into 
the small window of time (resulting from delays) set 
aside for the meetings. Recurrently, the administrators 
were absent during the agendas related to presenting 
new health policies; they were frequently dispersed, 
returning to the plenary sessions only for the approval 
and ratification of projects, focused more on the admin-
istrative rites than on the perspective of regional plan-
ning or assessment. Similarly, inadequate training for 
health management in a health macro-region in Minas 
Gerais,12 Southeastern Brazil, led to inadequacies in 
both the technical competence for the position held and 
the management capacity of local leaders.
The low autonomy of health administrators compared 
to the municipal executive power also represented a 
barrier to strengthen collective decisions. When added 
to the asymmetries of technical and political power, 
deliberations were yoked to the partisan political 
criteria above the technical such as, for example, the 
geographical distribution of health facilities and the 
contracting of medically specialized services/proce-
dures. On this issue, Lotufo & Miranda,15 considering 
the results of research with 36 administrators from 
12 states, argue that:
Table 1. Matrix to analyze governance in a regionalized health system. Vitória da Conquista, BA, Northeastern Brasil, 2012.
Components of 
regional governance
Political-institutional level Organizational level
Sub-dimensions Criteria/Indicators Criteria/Indicators
Mechanisms 
of regional 
governance
Government strategies to 
strengthen regional governance 
and improve healthcare networks 
in the health region
Operation and regularities of the Regional Interagency 
Committee meetings 
Content of the debate in the Regional Interagency Committee 
to strengthen the regionalized network
Advisory mechanism of the 20th Regional Health Directorate to 
strengthen the regionalized network
Institutional strategies to strengthen 
regional governance in the health region 
Municipalities that signed the Management Commitment 
Terms and assumed Sole Command
Existence and operation of the Inter-municipal Consortium of Health
Existence of an agreement between federal agencies through 
the Public Health Action Organizational Contract
Institutional strategy to develop and 
implement the Regional Action Plan 
for the health region
Existence, implementation, and monitoring of the Regional 
Action Plan for the health region 
Method of implementing the Integrated Agreed-upon Program 
for the supply of vacancies and existence/type of actions that 
contribute to reduce gaps in care 
Regional funding State strategies for funding and 
encouraging regionalization
Existence and type of regional investment (origin, types, and 
purposes) 
Existence and type of solidary allocations of financial 
resources aimed at offsetting inequalities in the region
Public-private 
relationships
Private providers’ mode of 
participation in the regionalization 
process and regional plans
Existence and use of contracting and monitoring of agreed-
upon targets with private providers in the health region 
Private sector’s influence on the process of regionalization and 
regional plans 
627Rev Saúde Pública 2014;48(4):622-631
“The prerogatives of power and institutional auto-
nomy of these health administrators, as well as 
their political capital, come from an indirect dele-
gation and a contractual (informal) relationship 
of trust with those public administrators who 
hold the formal political authority of an elective 
office. Therefore, their agency is sanctioned by 
those who delegated the prerogatives of decision-
making power to them and delimit their margins 
of political autonomy” (p. 1146).
A study with Health secretaries from 20 cities in the 
state of Sao Paulo4 found a limited ability to formulate, 
implement, and evaluate municipal health policies, 
equally linked to the predominance of untrained admin-
istrators, with no experience in public management and 
no understanding of what the SUS is. The power play 
in the CIR’s dynamic is uncertain; if, on the one hand, 
it feeds the idea of regional strengthening, on the other 
hand, local hegemonic forces have commandeered it to 
conserve the status quo.
Implications of the SUS’ financing and the health 
region’s subordination to the logic of private 
interests
In the health region studied, a shortfall in public vacan-
cies and long waiting times for access to specialized 
services in the SUS have pressured users to seek alter-
natives through direct disbursement, private health 
insurance, or through privileges from network profes-
sionals and/or political patronage, bypassing formal 
regulations for access. The administrators participating 
in the research attributed these issues, also observed 
in other studies,4,22 to the SUS being underfinanced. 
Insufficient financial resources prevented the SUS 
from complying with the Agreed-upon Program, or 
increasing its own public provision of services in the 
network. Paradoxically, it forced public administrators 
to purchase services on the healthcare market for values 
above those on the SUS’ Unified Table, since the prices 
charged by private providers were also freely inflated 
by public demand.
A critical point in the region’s network of services 
was the action of intermediaries, who were contracted 
by Health secretaries to expedite access to special-
ized services – diagnostic, therapeutic, and/or surgical 
support services – in other municipalities through 
direct payment (fees and bonuses) to physicians for 
procedures that were already covered by the SUS, 
issues that were repeated in another study.4 To expedite 
the surgical procedure in the region, physicians were 
contacted by Health secretaries or users and agreed on 
parallel criteria to perform this type of surgery in the 
SUS network, through “irregular payment”. They thus 
bypassed access regulations, not always supported by 
clinical priority criteria, contributing to an obstruction 
of vacancies, generating care iniquities and encouraging 
sponsorship, and the private use of public space. This 
Source: Adapted from Assis & Jorge2 (2010), p.155.
Figure. Development of a dialectical hermeneutics analysis.
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628 Regional governance in Bahia Santos AM & Giovanella L
issue also appeared as a common behavior of mayors 
and councilors, who coerced the Health secretaries in 
establishing processes parallel to the regional regulation, 
through paying physicians to expedite certain proce-
dures. They sought to consolidate certain privileges 
for political supporters, which ended up exacerbating 
inequalities in access to and use of public resources.
These conditions result in asymmetries of power (i.e., 
political, economic, and symbolic) among government, 
administrators, health professionals, and users, which 
are a part of social relationships in territories with popu-
lations that are socioeconomically weakened and lack 
effective universal social policies – although formally 
defined – in an explicit restriction of citizenship.21
Immediacy in debates and regional planning
Regional strategies to strengthen the network itself 
were tentative, focused on charging money to expand 
the specialized and hospital offerings in the region’s 
most important municipality, without coordinated 
actions to strengthen and resolve Primary Health Care 
and/or appropriately use the instruments for clinical 
management in each municipality. Furthermore, the 
municipal administrators were not able to properly 
regulate the private health sector. No mechanisms to 
curb the arbitrariness of private providers, who are free 
to increase the amounts collected from the SUS and 
directly charged to the users, were observed in the CIR. 
Other studies1,b,f also show that private providers orga-
nize themselves and seek to fill the gaps in SUS care, 
occupying more strategic and profitable niches, and 
exerting considerable attractiveness for new demands 
and a strong political, technical, and symbolic influ-
ence on public systems.
The administrators centered the debate in the CIR 
around the allocation of resources, particularly in 
regards to the failure to provide part of the services 
that the municipalities had already agreed they would 
perform, the difficulty of hiring and retaining physicians 
for different services, and the unavailability of beds 
in important hospitals. Although they recognized that 
their offerings were insufficient, they did not address 
a regional plan that would challenge these limitations. 
f Lima LL. Gestão da política de saúde no município: a questão da autonomia [dissertação de mestrado]. Porto Alegre: Instituto de Filosofia e 
Ciências Humanas da UFRGS; 2005.
Table 2. Characteristics of the municipalities and health administrators. Vitória da Conquista, BA, Northeastern Brazil, 2012.
Municipality
Population
(inhab.)a
Health 
management
Health secretary’s 
training
Year they 
assumed their 
positiond
Mayor’s 
partyb 
(2009-2012)
Mayor’s 
partyb 
(2013-2016)
Anagé 25.516 State Law 2009 PTB PT
Barra do Choça 34.788 Municipal Administration 2009 PP PP
Belo Campo 16.021 Municipal Nursing 2010 DEM PSD
Bom Jesus da Serra 10.113 State Pedagogyc 2008 PMDB PSD
Caetanos 13.639 State Administration 2006 PSB PSDB
Cândido Sales 27.918 State Administrationc 2011 PMDB PSB
Caraíbas 10.222 State High school 2007 PTB PDT
Condeúba 16.898 State Geography 2008 PMDB PT
Cordeiros 8.168 State Nursing 2009 PT PSD
Encruzilhada 23.766 State Lawc 2010 PTB PT
Maetinga 7.038 Municipal Biology 2007 DEM PT
Mirante 10.507 State Administration 2009 PMDB PMDB
Piripá 12.783 State Nursing 2005 PDT PP
Planalto 24.481 State Nursing 2006 PP PT
Poções 44.701 State Engineering 2009 PTB PC do B
Pres. Jânio Quadros 13.652 Municipal Pharmacology 2009 PMDB PT
Ribeirão do Largo 8.602 State Middle Level 2011 PT PMDB
Tremedal 17.029 State Administrationc 2009 PSC PT
Vitória da Conquista 306.866 Municipal Nursing 2010 PT PT
a Source: IBGE – 2010 Census.
b Source: Superior Electoral Court, 2012.
c In progress.
d Held the position in December, 2011.
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Furthermore, there was no permanent technical staff 
(technical board), internal to the CIR, to analyze 
and propose strategies for strengthening the regional 
network and overcoming common problems, or broach 
these proposals at the plenary sessions.
However, the CIR presented itself as a space for 
dialogue between administrators with different visions 
and projects, especially when the national/state legal 
norms required a regional discussion. The processes 
to approve new local and regional programs and poli-
cies required the administrators to present their proj-
ects in the plenary session for consideration by the 
CIR members. Even with the prerogative of munic-
ipal autonomy, the CIR continued, via negotiation and 
consensus, to limit the inter-municipal relationships 
to define the sites to expand and improve the regional 
network’s offering, particularly with respect to defining 
the urgency and emergency networks (regional SAMU) 
and the maternal and child network (Stork Network).
In this direction, each municipality’s special projects 
(Family Health Strategy, Support Center for Family 
Health, Oral Health Teams, Academy of Health, School 
Health Program, among others) were also presented in 
the meetings, requiring the CIR approval as a condition 
for receiving state and federal resources. Consequently, 
even though it was a bureaucratic and, to some extent, 
ritualistic space to get investments, the CIR functioned 
as a space for exchanging project designs and, poten-
tially, played an educational role among its members, 
coinciding with the findings of other studies.1,11
The CIR’s positive characteristics have been accel-
erated by the SES through the recommendations of 
technicians experienced in organizing networks with 
effective members, which contributed to qualifying 
the debates and conducting the plenary sessions. 
Furthermore, the State Board of Primary Care, through 
institutional supporters, and the Regional Directorate of 
Health have contributed to resolving contentious issues, 
such as the technical definition for allocating resources 
and/or establishing health in the region, and aggregating 
municipalities around projects that require extensive 
membership, as with the Program for Improving the 
Access and Quality of Primary Care. The municipali-
ties themselves sent professionals to attend meetings, 
where they technically supported the secretaries and 
qualified the debate for decision making.
Micropowers: the paradox between regional 
bodies and local interests
The CIR’s internal inconsistencies strain the private 
interests of local political power at the municipal level 
and the regional needs of a more solidary nature. The 
findings of Lanni et al11 indicate that one of the chal-
lenges for SUS administrators is to “articulate the SUS’ 
ongoing process of decentralization and regionalization 
in different local and regional policy scenarios, from 
the perspective of disrupting local patronage and autar-
chic actions among the levels of government” (p. 927). 
Through this prism, governance in the region of Vitória 
da Conquista expresses these ambiguities, as partisan 
political interferences compromise the construction of 
an integrated network of services and private providers 
exert strong pressure on the supply and densification 
of services. Furthermore, social participation, whether 
institutional through municipal health councils or 
through advocacy, does not critically vocalize the prob-
lems of regionalization. This correlation of forces runs 
through the regional board as well, since the Health 
secretaries are the interlocutors and representatives of 
these local and regional forces and weaknesses.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The regional debate is permeated with urgent issues: 
insufficient provision of services; an increase in salaries 
and procedures, particularly that of physicians; over-
crowding in hospitals; a large unhelpful Family Health 
Strategy, among others. Thus, the central points, such as 
planning a regionalized provision of services, defining a 
care model, and reorganizing the health work process to 
produce care, either do not appear or remain marginal.
Under the protection of the Health Pact, regionalization 
assumes a network of interdependent health services 
with mutual responsibility among the subnational enti-
ties, but without implying subordination among them.15 
This perspective, which presumes municipal autonomy 
and regional coordination aligned with the plurality 
of subjects involved in regional management, should 
assume the design of public governance in the health 
services network.
The region studied also presents preliminary charac-
teristics for a regional governance. From the viewpoint 
of institutionalism, the CIR’s existence – with regular 
operation and required processes for raising funds and 
investments in the region linked to the board’s consensus 
– is a powerful mechanism for asserting relationships of 
co-responsibility. The institutional learning that results 
from the dynamic of participating in the CIR strengthens 
interagency management and presents itself as an impor-
tant component for constructing a regionalized network. 
In contrast, the exercise of governance is limited to the 
premises of the CIR, which is only instituted by Health 
secretaries. However, the other subjects that form the 
regionalized network establish hierarchical and/or 
informal interfaces in the decision-making process, 
seeking to defend their interests before the State or 
influence its decisions about sectorial policies that affect 
them, within a panorama of scarce financial resources.
In summary, the characteristics found in the region 
demonstrate a regionalized network with a conflictive 
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pattern of governance and an intermediary insti-
tutionalism. In a conflictive-type governance, the 
relationship between the actors is conflicted and 
the technical-political context has low coordina-
tion, while the presence of intermediary institution-
alism presents a process wherein regional maturity 
and integration between the actors have not been 
consolidated or are incipient, but there are indica-
tions in this direction.14,25 In the CIR, this has been 
explained by the absence of permanent technical 
groups, lack of regional instruments for planning 
and investment, the Health secretaries’ high turn-
over rate – notably every municipal election period 
– which affects the accumulation of knowledge and 
institutional learning. In addition, Health secretaries 
have low autonomy in comparison with the municipal 
executive (few are Municipal Health Fund adminis-
trators), and agendas are driven by ministerial/state 
demands to the detriment of planning and debating 
local and regional issues.
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